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NOTES

spell out as clearly as possible when and how to conduct the search so as to
eliminate the potential for abuse." 99
It is submitted that the model statute proposed here, or one similar to
it, would be an effective means to this end, and would be appropriate for
adoption in Oklahoma.
H. David Hanes

Criminal Procedure: Creating Great Risk of Death
to More Than One Person As An Aggravating

Circumstance
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court during the past decade
have caused confusion with respect to the procedural requirements necessary
for a death penalty statute to be constitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. This confusion
hampered the development of an Oklahoma capital sentencing procedure
until 1976 when the legislature enacted the present death penalty statute.' The
Simons, supra note 1, at 57.
21 OKLA. STAT. §§ 701.9-701.13 (Supp. 1980):
"§ 701.9. Punishment for murder.-A. A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or
nolo contendere to murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for
life.
"B. A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the
second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in a state penal institution for not less than ten
(10) years nor more than life.
"§ 701.10. Sentencing proceeding-Murder in the first degree.-Upon conviction or
adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder in the first degree, the court shall conduct a
separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury
as soon as practicable without presentence investigation. If the trial jury has been waived by the
defendant and the state, or if the defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, the sentencing
proceeding shall be conducted before the court. In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in this act. Only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the
defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. However, this section shall not be construed to
authorize the introduction of any evidence secure in violation of the Constitutions of the United
States or of the State of Oklahoma. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted
to present argument for or against sentence of death.
"§ 701.11 Instructions-Jury findings of aggravating circumstance.-In the sentencing
proceeding, the statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the
evidence shall be given in the charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its
verdict be a unanimous recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the
foreman of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it
unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make such
designation. Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act
is so found or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the finding
"
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2
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has only recently ruled on the statute.

A complete analysis of the Oklahoma statute would be an extensive
undertaking. The scope of this note will be limited to an examination of one
of the aggravating circumstances: "The defendant knowingly created a great
of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree as to punishment, the judge shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.
"§ 701.12 Aggravating circumstances.-Aggravating circumstances shall be:
"1. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person;
"2. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person;
"3. The person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
"4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
"5. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or prosecution;
"6. The murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment
on conviction of a felony; or
"7. The existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
"§ 701.13. Death penalty-Review of sentence.-A. Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed
on the record by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. The clerk of the trial court, within
ten (10) days after receiving the transcript, shall transmit the entire record and transcript to the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals together with a notice prepared by the clerk and a report
prepared by the trial judge. The notice shall set forth the title and docket number of the case, the
name of the defendant and the name and address of his attorney, a narrative statement of the
judgment, the offense, and the punishment prescribed. The report shall be in the form of a
standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
"B. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals shall consider the punishment as well
as any errors enumerated by way of appeal.
"C. With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine:
"1. Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
"2. Whether the evidence supports the jury's 'or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in this act; and
"3. Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
"D. Both the defendant and the state shall have the right to submit briefs within the
time provided by the court, and to present oral argument to the court.
"E. The court shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it
took into consideration. In addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the court,
with regard to review of death sentences, shall be authorized to:
"1. Affirm the sentence of death; or
"2. Set the sentence aside and remand the case for modification of the sentence to
imprisonment for life.
"F. The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal, if taken, and the review
and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall render its decision on legal
errors enumerated, the factual substantiation of the verdict, and the validity of the sentence,"
2 Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Cr. 1980); Hays v. State, 617 P.2d 223 (Okla. Cr.
1980); Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Cr. 1980); Chancy v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla.
Cr. 1980), cen. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1731 (1981).
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risk of death to more than one person." 3 Specifically, the note will focus on
the interpretation of the phrase made by various state courts and the United
States Supreme Court and suggest guidelines for its application in Oklahoma.
Background
The death penalty has existed throughout this nation's history.' When
the eighth amendment was adopted in 1791, the states uniformly followed the
common law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence
for certain specified offenses.' By 1972 those states still using capital punishment had abandoned mandatory death sentences, and instead allowed the
jury "unguided and unrestrained discretion" in imposing the sentence of
death in a capital case. 6 In Furman v. Georgia7 the Supreme Court, in a fiveto-four per curiam decision, held that the death penalty as employed in
Georgia and Texas constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 8 Each justice filed a separate opinion, which led to a blurring of the scope and parameters of the ruling. The
opinions indicated that as a result of giving juries unguided discretion in the
imposition of the death penalty for murder, the penalty was being imposed
discriminatorily, 9 wantonly and freakishly,'" and so infrequently" that any
given death sentence was cruel and unusual.
In response to the confusion engendered by Furman, some states
adopted mandatory death penalties for a limited number of specific crimes.
Other states continued to assess the culpability of each defendant convicted
of a capital offense and provided standards to guide the sentencer.' 2
The procedural requirements of a constitutional death penalty were addressed more specifically by the Supreme Court in 1976 when it examined
collectively five' 3 of the post-Furman statutes. The Court specifically rejected
mandatory execution for certain crimes as unconstitutional in Woodson v.
North Carolina"'and in Roberts v. Louisiana.'"The remaining cases involved
statutes of Florida, Georgia, and Texas, all of which attempted to eliminate
I 21A OKLA.

STAT. § 701.12(2) (Supp. 1979).
4 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890).
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1976).
6 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598 (1978).
7 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
" Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
" Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
' See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1710 (1974).
,1Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
" Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Is 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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arbitrary and capricious sentencing through the use of various procedural
safeguards. The Court upheld these statutes. 6 The Gregg opinion reasoned
that to comply with the Furman sentencing guidelines a procedure should not
create a "substantial risk that the death penalty [will] be inflicted in an ar' 17
bitrary and capricious manner.
The Georgia code, under consideration in Gregg, required the sentencer
to consider "any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances
otherwise authorized by law" and listed ten aggravating circumstances, at
least one of which had to be found to exist by the sentencer in order to return
a death sentence." The Florida system resembled the Georgia system except
for the basic difference that in Florida the sentence is determined by the trial
judge rather than by the jury."9 The Texas procedure narrowed capital
offenses to five categories."0 When murder occurred in one of the five circumstances, the death penalty had to be imposed if the jury made certain
additional findings against the defendant. 2'
State Interpretations
The United States Supreme Court addressed the aggravating circumstance of creating a great risk of death to more than one person in Gregg
and Proffitt. The Georgia statute describes the aggravating circumstance as:
"The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place
by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the
lives of more than one person." 2
16

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1

(1977); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37-07 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1977).
17
'

"

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1977).

428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976).

20 TEx. PENAL CODE, art. 1257 (1973): "(1)

The person murdered a peace officer or
fireman who was acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who the defendant knew
was a peace officer or fireman;
"(2) the person intentionally committed the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson;
"(3) the person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remunera-

tion or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise or remuneration;
"(4)

the person committed the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a

penal institution;
"(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murdered another who was
employed in the operation of the penal institution....
"(c) If the jury does not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed under one of the circumstances or conditions enumerated in Subsection (b) of this Article,
the defendant may be convicted of murder, with or without malice, under Subsection (a) of this
Article or of any other lesser included offense."
Article 1257 has been superseded by § 19.03 of the new Texas Penal Code, which is
substantially similar to article 1257.
2- 428 'U.S. 262, 264 (1976).
22

GA. CODE

§ 27-2534.1(B)(3) (1977).
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In Gregg this aggravating circumstance was challenged as being vague
and therefore susceptible of widely differing interpretations, thus creating
substantial risk that the death penalty would be arbitrarily imposed by
juries. 23 In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court admitted that the
phrase was "susceptible of an overbroad interpretation." 24 However, the
Court stopped short of striking the circumstance because it approved of the
construction given the phrase by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Chenault
v. State,"' the only case that had relied on this circumstance. In Chenault the
defendant, during a Sunday morning church service, stood up, shot and
killed the organist and another person, and then turned and began to fire
randomly into the congregation.2 6 The United States Supreme Court
favorably compared this application to another where the Georgia Supreme
Court reversed a finding of great risk when the victim was simply kidnapped
in a parking lot and then found shot dead on an isolated road.27
The Georgia interpretations apparently restrict the application of the
aggravating circumstance to situations where (1) several persons are present
at the murder; and (2) the defendant uses a weapon that, by its nature, will
threaten the lives of those other than the intended victim. In subsequent decisions the Georgia court consistently required the presence of both factors to
support a finding of the aggravating circumstance.2" In Jones v. State29 the
defendant and two other men attempted to rob a convenience store. Two
employees were in the public area of the store when a struggle ensued between the victim and one of the robbers and shots were fired. Two of the
offenders were wounded. 0 The setting of the murder was a public place with
more than one person present. The Georgia court expressly concluded that
the murder weapon, a .32 caliber automatic, was a weapon that was normally
hazardous to the lives of more than one person when used in a public place.2 '
In Proffitt the United States Supreme Court examined the Florida version of the specific aggravating circumstance.3 2 Only once prior to Proffitt
had Florida relied on this aggravating circumstance to support a sentence of
death. 33 In that case the Florida Supreme Court focused its analysis on the
number of persons present and therefore endangered by the defendant's conduct. The Florida court held that the defendant created a great risk of death
because he "obviously murdered two of the victims in order to avoid a sur23

428 U.S. 153, 202 (1976).

24

Id.

28

234 Ga. 216, 215 S.E.2d 223 (1975).
Id., 215 S.E.2d at 225.
Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 424, 216 S.E.2d 258, 269 (1975).
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820, 256 S.E.2d 907 (1979).

29

Id.

22
26
27

Id., 256 S.E.2d at 909-10.
Id., 256 S.E.2d at 916.
32FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(c) (Supp. 1976-1977), which provides: "The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons."
" Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975).
SO

"
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viving witness to the murder of. the other victim." 3 ' Proffitt reduced to one
the number of other persons required to be present for a finding of the aggravating circumstance. The Florida court found that Proffitt had created a
great risk of death to many persons by killing the victim and then beating the
victim's wife. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that Proffitt
could be construed to have broadened the interpretation of the statute, but it
refused to find that in fact it had. 3- The United States Supreme Court concluded that the Florida provisions, as 3construed
by the Supreme Court of
6
Florida, were not impermissibly vague.
Although the United States Supreme Court's warning in Proffitt seems
clear, subsequent Florida decisions show no consistent requirement for the
number of persons who must be endangered before the aggravating circumstance can be found. In 1977 the Florida court did not reject a finding by
the trial court that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death to the
nearly forty persons present during a liquor store robbery.7 Although many
persons were in the area, the facts did not support a finding that those individuals were subjected to a "great risk of death." One victim was shot with a
handgun at close range. The other victim was shot with a shotgun in a parking lot where only one other person was present.38
In subsequent decisions the Florida court has sustained its inconsistency
as to the number of persons required to have been threatened before a finding of the aggravating circumstance would be upheld. Although earlier
holdings 3' found the presence of one or two other persons to be sufficient, in
1979 the Florida court rejected a finding of the aggravating circumstance
where five shots were fired at close range and two persons other than the
defendant and the victim were present."' The court explained:
When the legislature chose the words with which to establish this
aggravating circumstance, it indicated clearly that more was con3' Id. at 540.

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 256 n.13 (1976). The Court explained: "While it
might be argued that this case broadens that construction, since only one person other than the
victim was attacked at all and then only by being hit with a fist, this would be to read more into
the State Supreme Court's opinion than is actually there. That court considered 11 claims of
error advanced by the petitioner, including the trial judge's finding that none of the statutory
mitigating circumstances existed. It did not, however, consider whether the findings as to each of
the statutory aggravating circumstances were supported by the evidence. If only one aggravating
circumstance had been found, or if some mitigating circumstance had been found to exist but
not to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, we would be justified in concluding that the
State Supreme Court had necessarily decided this point even though it had not expressly done so.
However, in the circumstances of this case, when four separate aggravating circumstances were
found and where each mitigating circumstance was expressly found not to exist, no such holding
on the part of the State Supreme Court can be implied." [Court's emphasis.]
16 Id. at 456.
McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1977) (sentence modified on other grounds).
Id. at 1277.
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975).
40 Kampff v. State, 371 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1979).
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templated than a showing of some degree of risk of bodily harm to a
few persons. "Great risk" means not mere possibility but a likelihood
or high probability. The great risk of death created by the capital
felon's actions must be to "many" persons. By using the word
"many", the legislature indicated that a great risk of death to a small
number of people would not establish this aggravating circumstance. 4 '
Yet, in the same year the Florida court also upheld a finding of the
aggravating circumstance where only two other persons were present and injured.4 2 The court focused on the nature of the defendant's conduct, saying:
"Both crimes were part of the conduct surrounding the capital felony. All
three crimes resulted from the appellant's raging gun battle. This is precisely
'43
the kind of conduct to which the statute refers.
In another 1979 case, the facts of which are not distinguishable from
those in the case above, where two persons other than the victim were present
and in the possible path of bullets, the Florida court found insufficient
grounds for a finding of a great risk to many persons.4
This inconsistent application of the Florida aggravating circumstance
casts doubt on the constitutionality of the statute. Without a consistent interpretation, the sentencer does not have the guidance needed to avoid imposition of the death penalty in the arbitrary manner prohibited by Furman.
Moreover, the Florida approach of analyzing the number of persons
killed or endangered does not serve to measure the defendant's degree of
culpability. The focus of analysis in a review of death sentences should be on
the nature of the defendant's conduct. The United States Supreme Court has
4
held mandatory death sentences for murder to be unconstitutional. '
Therefore, each murder must be examined to determine whether the defendant's act of killing was of such a degree of culpability that he should be put
to death. The interpretations by the Supreme Court of Louisiana of that
state's version of this aggravating circumstance 4 , illustrate this examination
of the nature of the defendant's conduct.
In State v. English47 the Louisiana court construed the legislative intent
from the wording of the provision to mean that the aggravating circumstance
should be found "when the single course of conduct contemplates and causes
the knowing creation of great risk of death or great bodily harm to more
than one person" and not when "it appears that the defendant intended to
commit each murder by a distinct act, that is, by shooting each intended victim individually at short range."'"
Id.at 1009-10.
Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979).
4' Id. at 1153.
" Lewis v. State, 377 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1979).
41Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See text accompanying note 8, supra.
46 LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 905.4(d) (West Supp. 1978), which provides: "The
offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person."
41 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979).
11Id.at 824.
42
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The distinction is between the situation where the distinct act of the
defendant not only kills the victim but also creates a risk of death to more
than one person' and the situation where several acts by the defendant, i.e.,
a consecutive course of conduct, contemplates and causes such a risk.so In
the latter situation, the defendant's act of killing, i.e., the physiological action that sets in motion the forces that kill, creates a risk of death only to the
victim. It is any subsequent and related acts by the defendant that threaten
the lives of others.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana consistently applied the English interpretation in subsequent cases. In State v. Martins" the defendant entered a
trailer and shot the four persons present. The court upheld the finding of the
aggravating circumstance, concluding that the "defendant murdered the victims one after the other as a part of a single consecutive course of conduct in
order to prevent5 any of the victims from reporting to the police the murders
of the others."
In State v. Sonnier" the Louisiana court reaffirmed the English interpretation and held that "where an offender kills two or more persons during
single consecutive course of conduct for the purpose of preventing any one of
those killed from disclosing the murder of the other, or others, then
the of' 4
fender's conduct is within the contemplated statutory meaning.
The differentiation between the distinct act interpretation and the
course of conduct interpretation is not merely an academic one. The choice
of interpretation can be determinative of the finding of the aggravating circumstance. For example, in Martin" the defendant's act of pulling the trigger and killing each victim did not create a risk of death to anyone but that
victim. Under the distinct act interpretation the aggravating circumstance
could not have been found. Another example is State v. Williams," where
the defendant, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, and his partner entered a
supermarket and proceeded immediately toward the security guard, who was
bagging groceries. The partner reached to remove the guard's pistol from its
holster. As the guard moved his hand toward his pistol, the defendant yelled
' An example would be where the defendant had set a fire, or had exploded a bomb in a
bus station, or had shot randomly into a crowd.
,0 For example, where the defendant, in the course of robbing a grocery store, kills the
manager in the store office and then engages in a shoot-out with police in the crowded store
while attempting to escape.
376 So. 2d 300 (La. 1979).
Id. at 312.
" 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1980).
', Id. at 1362. In a separate opinion, one justice viewed the majority's interpretation as
overly broad, and suggested that the single, distinct act analysis was what was contemplated by
the legislature. In his opinion, the majority expanded the category to include every multiple
murder, resulting in a statutory construction that casts doubt upon the constitutionality of Louisiana's entire capital punishment scheme by violation of the requirements of Gregg and Proffitt.
Id. at 1367 (Dennis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
5, 376 So. 2d 300 (La. 1979).
56

383 So. 2d 369 (La. 1980).
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and immediately shot the guard in the face at point-blank range. In addition,
during the course of the robbery, two customers were shot, each one in the
foot and apparently accidentally, by the defendant.5 7 The distinct act approach would not support a finding of the aggravating circumstance because
there was no evidence that the act of killing the victim threatened the other
patrons present. However, the aggravating circumstance could be found by
examining the defendant's whole course of conduct during the robberys
Oklahoma
The Oklahoma legislature understood Furman to mean that the only
constitutional statutory scheme for the imposition of death was one wherein
no discretion existed."9 In 1973 the legislature repealed the existing capital
punishment provisions and enacted a new statute"0 thought to comply with
"

Id. at 371.

The Louisiana court decided that it was unnecessary and merely cumulative to inquire
further into whether the jury's findng of risk was proper because the jury had properly found
another aggravating circumstance to exist. Id. at 374.
51 Riggs v. Branch, 554 P.2d 823, 828 (Okla. Cr. 1976). See Pate v. State,
507 P.2d 915
(Okla. Cr. 1973).
1021 OKLA. STAT. §§ 701.1 through 701.6 (Supp. 1973), reads as follows:
"701.1 Murder in the first degree.-Homocide, when perpetrated without authority of
law and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any other
human being, is murder in the first degree in the following cases:
"1. When perpetrated against any peace officer, prosecuting attorney, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties;
"2. When perpetrated by one committing or attempting to commit rape, kidnapping
for the purpose of extortion, arson in the first degree, armed robbery or when death occurs
following the sexual molestation of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years;
"3. When perpetrated against any witness subpoenaed to testify at any preliminary
hearing, trial or grand jury proceeding against the defendant who kills or procures the killing of
the witness, or when perpetrated against any human being while intending to kill such witness;
"4. When perpetrated against the President or Vice President of the United States of
America, any official in line of succession to the Presidency of the United States of America, the
Governor or Lieutenant Governor of this state, a judge of any appellate court or court of record
of this state, or any person actively engaged in a campaign for the office of the Presidency or
Vice Presidency of the United States of America.
"5. When perpetrated by any person engaged in the pirating of an aircraft, train, bus
or other commercial vehicle for hire which regularly transports passengers;
"6. When perpetrated by a person who effects the death of a human being in exchange
for money or any other thing of value, or by the person procuring the killing;
"7. Murder by a person under a sentence of life imprisonment in the penitentiary;
"8. When perpetrated against two or more persons arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence or series of events closely related in time and location;
"9. When perpetrated against a child while in violation of Section 843, Title 21 of the
Oklahoma Statutes; and
"10. Intentional murder by the unlawful and malicious use of a bomb or of any similar
explosive."
"§ 701.2 Murder in the second degree.-Homocide is murder in the second degree in the
following cases:
"1. When perpetrated without authority of law, and with a premeditated design to ef"
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the mandate of Furman.6' The 1973 statute was declared unconstitutional by
the United States Supreme Court in July, 1976.62
In the same year, a special session of the legislature enacted a new
statute, resembling the statutes of Florida and Georgia, that is in operation
today.63 Basically, the statute provides for a bifurcated proceeding. The guilt
or innocence of the defendant is determined in the first stage. In the second,
fect the death of a person, or of any other human being, but by an act not enumerated in the
preceding section;
"2. When perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved
mind, regardless of human life, although without any premediated design to effect the death of
any particular individual; or
"3. When perpetrated without any design to effect the death by a person engaged in the
commission of any felony other than the felonious acts set out in Section 1 of this act."
"§ 701.3 Punishmentfor murderin the first degree-Instructionsregardinglesserand included offenses.-Every person convicted of murder in the first degree shall suffer death. In the
case of a jury trial, the jury shall determine only whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of
murder in the first degree and upon a finding of guilty shall so indicate on their verdict and state
affirmatively in their verdict that the defendant shall suffer death. In a case where the jury trial
is waived and the case is tried to the court, or upon a finding by the court that the defendant is
guilty of murder in the first degree, the court shall enter a judgment and sentence of death. In a
jury trial for murder in the first degree, nothing in this section shall preclude the trial judge from
instructing the jury regarding lesser and included offenses and lesser degrees of homicide if the
evidence warrants such instructions; but in every instance where an instruction authorizes the
jury to consider lesser and included offenses and lesser degrees of homicide, the judge shall state
into the record his reasons for giving the instruction based upon the evidence adduced at trial."
"§ 701.4 Punishmentfor murder in the second degree-Indeterminatesentence.-Every
person convicted of murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the State
Penitentiary for not less than ten (10) years nor more than life. The trial court shall set an
indeterminate sentence in accordance with this section upon a finding of guilty by the jury of
murder in the second degree."
"§ 701.5 Review of judgment and sentence of death.-The Court of Criminal Appeals
when reviewing a judgment and sentence of death, shall, in the first instance, determine whether
errors of law occurring at trial require reversal or modifiction, but if the Court shall determine
that there are no errors of law in the record requiring reversal or modification, the Court shall
then convene for the purpose of reviewing the sentence of death. The Court shall set a date certain for an evidentiary hearing, the purpose of which will be to determine if the sentence of
death comports with the principles of due process and equal protection of the law. Upon the
hearing the Court shall determine whether the sentence of death was a result of discrimination
based on race, creed, economic condition, social position, class or sex of the defendant or any
other arbitrary fact; and the Court shall specifically determine whether the sentence of death is
substantially disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant."
"§ 701.6Modification of death sentence.-Should the Court determine that the sentence
of death is discriminatory or is substantially disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, the Court shall modify the sentence of
death to life in the penitentiary at the hard labor. (Emphasis added)"
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
62 Williams v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); Justus v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907
(1976); Rowbothan v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); Lusty v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907
(1976); Green v.Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); Davis v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976).
1121 OKLA. STAT. §§ 701.7-701.13 (Supp. 1976).
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sentencing stage of the trial, the jury shall not impose the death penalty

unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances"' is found to
exist and to outweigh one or more mitigating circumstances. While the jury
may only consider the enumerated statutory aggravating circumstances, it
may reflect on evidence submitted by the defendant regarding anything he

considers to be a mitigating circumstance.,"
The Oklahoma version of this particular aggravating circumstance pro-

vides: "The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than
one person."

66

It has been relied upon to support a death sentence in only

one case, Hays v. State.6 1 In Hays the "great risk of death" was apparently
created when sometime after the murder, the defendant pulled a revolver
from a paper sack and pointed it at a group68 of teenagers who were taunting
him as he staggered across an intersection.
The application of the course of conduct approach in Hays was extremely broad in that the defendant's act of waving the gun was unconnected
with the act of killing, both in terms of time and location. It is also very
doubtful that by merely waving the gun the defendant "created a great risk

of death to more than one person."
The repealed 1973 statute encompassed both the consecutive course of

conduct approach 9 and the stricter distinct act approach.7" The wording of
Id. Section 701.12 provides for the following aggravating circumstances:
"1. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person;
"2. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person;
"3. The person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
"4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
"5. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or prosecution;
"6. The murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment
on conviction of a felony; or
"7. The existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."
61 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10 (Supp. 1979). In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978),
the United States Supreme Court held that in capital cases the sentencing authority must consider as a mitigating factor any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
64

" 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.12(2) (Supp. 1979).
67 617 P.2d 223 (Okla. Cr. 1980).
" Id. at 226.

, 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.1(8) (Supp. 1973), which provided for mandatory infliction of
the death penalty for murder in the first degree "when perpetrated against two or more persons
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of events closely related in time and
location."
70 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.1(10) (Supp. 1973), which provided for mandatory infliction of
the death penalty for murder in the first degreee for "intentional murder by the unlawful and
malicious use of a bomb or of any similar explosive."
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the present statute does not indicate a selection of either approach, so it may
be assumed that the Oklahoma courts are not limited by the stricter distinct
act interpretation. Of course, given the haste with which the present statute
was enacted, it may be that the legislature gave no thought to the matter.
The distinct act approach is a very narrow interpretation of the aggravating circumstance. It would provide a concrete guideline for the jury in
determining the culpability of a defendant in a capital case, and it would
limit the number of fact situations wherein the aggravating circumstance
could be found, leaving little discretion to the jury. However, it may be too
narrow in that it would fail to include some fact situations where a great risk
of death to others had been created.
The consecutive course of conduct approach is a far more workable
guideline, but it must be applied narrowly because a too broad application
may be unconstitutional by allowing the jury too much discretion in applying
the aggravating circumstance to a particular fact situation. Under this approach, the defendant's acts that create the risk of death should be in close
proximity, in terms of time, location, and intent, to the act of killing. It
should be insufficient that the defendant, some time after the murder, committed an act that endangered others. To support the aggravating circumstance, the subsequent act should be inextricably linked to the killing.
Hays illustrates the danger of a too broad application. The waving of
the revolver, even if dangerous, was at best tenuously connected with the killing. It cannot be said in that case that by waving the gun Hays became more
culpable than if he had only shot the victim without any subsequent conduct.
In future cases the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should require that
any acts by the defendant that are used to support a finding of the aggravating circumstance must be more closely related to the act of killing for
which defendant has been convicted.
Conclusion
Although the phrase "knowingly created a great risk of death to more
than one person" on its face appears to be a relatively clear instruction, when
one tries to apply it to a specific fact situation the ambiguity of the wording
becomes ob,Aous. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court apparently mandate a narrow application of the aggravating circumstance. The
consecutive course of conduct approach is within constitutional parameters
when the acts of the defendant that are used to support the aggravating circumstance are closely related to the act of killing. The application of the
aggravating circumstance by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
should be far stricter than that in Hays.
John Michael Nordin
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